Unemployment benefit systems in Central and Eastern Europe : a review of the 1990s by Vodopivec, Milan et al.
SP  DISCUSSION  PAPER  NO.0310
- ~26307
IU3nemployment  Benefit
Systems in  Central and
Eastern Europe:





rot  i  n
RKETS,  PENSIONS,  SOCIAL  ASSISTANCE
















































































































dUNEMPLOYMENT  BENEFIT SYSTEMS  IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN  EUROPE:
A REVIEW OF THE 1990s
Milan Vodopivec',  Andreas Wbrg6tter,*' and Dhushyanth RajunS*
1.  INTRODUCTION
One  of the  most  conspicuous  consequences  of the  transition  of  former  socialist
economies  has  been  the  emergence  of large-scale,  open unemployment  - a phenomenon
unheard  of before  the  transition.  These  economies  have  thus  been  confronted  with  the
difficult task of protecting the unemployed while avoiding undue fiscal costs and minimizing
work disincentives  created by such protection.
Faced with the prospect of high unemployment, many transition economies  introduced
traditional,  OECD-style unemployment  insurance  programs.  The purpose of this paper is to
evaluate  those programs  by examining  their distributive  and efficiency  effects.  To  address
distributive  issues  (an  aspect  so  far  neglected  by  researchers),  we  analyze  data  from
household expenditure  surveys and try to answer the following two questions:  Which groups
of workers  benefited most?  How have these programs changed the pre-transfer distribution
of income?  To examine efficiency  effects, we review the existing literature.  The questions
that  have  received  the  most  attention  are:  Have  unemployment  benefits  created  work
disincentives?  In  particular,  have  more  generous  replacement  rates  and  longer  benefit
durations  affected  the  length  of unemployment  spells?  We  also  examine  whether  the
introduction  of  unemployment  benefit  programs  has  helped  to  speed  up  enterprise
restructuring.  (We  found  no  study  that  examined  the  possible  positive  effects  of
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Iunemployment  benefit  systems - for example, better job matching  as reflected  by increased
reemployment  earnings.)
In this study, we would like to shed light on the question of the suitability of traditional
unemployment  insurance  programs  for  transition  economies,  including  those  with  poor
administrative  capacities  and  low incomes  per  capita.  This  concem  relates  to  distributive
issues:  unemployment  insurance benefits may be regressive, that is, mostly paid to better-off
workers.  Moreover,  because of the lack of administrative  capacity  in these countries, there
may be significant  "leakage" of these  benefits.  And unemployment benefits  may also  hurt
efficiency.  They may create work disincentives  and, by increasing  the bargaining power of
workers,  contribute  to  higher equilibrium  unemployment  and increased  employment  in the
informal sector.
The paper  is  organized  as  follows.  We  first  describe  how  the  reduction  of output
translated  into the  increase  of unemployment,  and  discuss  the nature  of unemployment  in
transition countries  as it evolved  in the first ten years (Section  2).  We focus on Central and
East European  as well as Baltic countries, which constitute  a relatively homogeneous  group.
We  emphasize  differences  in the responsiveness  of employment reduction to output  decline
across  these countries,  which were undoubtedly  at  least partly produced by different policy
choices.  We  then describe  formal  unemployment benefit progms introduced by transition
countries  (Section  3)  and,  in the  core  section,  evaluate  these  systems  by presenting  their
distributive  and  efficiency  effects  (Section  4).  We  conclude  with  a  summary  of main
findings and a discussion of emerging policy issues.
2.  UNEMPLGYMENT  AND TRANST(N
Transition  reforms  have  drastically  reduced  output  and  severely  affected
employment.'  The cumulative  GDP decline was about 25-35  percent for Central and Eastem
European  (CEE)  economies  and 40-50  percent  for the Baltic  republics  (Table  1).  Growth
tumaround was  first  achieved by Poland  (1992),  followed  shortly thereafter  by the  Czech
Republic  and  Slovenia  (1993).  With  the  exception  of the  Czech  Republic,  Romania  and
'  Output decline was predominately related to supply side shocks, and long-standing  structural imbalances
under the socialist regime (see Holmann et al,  1995).
2Bulgaria,  GDP in all countries  grew in the late  1990s;  still, by 2000, GDP  levels surpassed
their respective  1989 levels only in Poland (by a substantial 26 percent),  Slovenia, Slovakia,
and Hungary.
How did the reductions  in output affect employment and, ultimately,  unemployment?
Some countries protected their workers  from unemployment  by reducing  average wages and
keeping reductions  of the workforce  to  a minimum  even in the wake of output  reductions.
Another way was through the use of government subsidies to promote early retirement.  This
section examines how labor market stocks adjusted to the decline of output.  It describes  both
employment responses to output decline, as well as trends in unemployment.  It also analyzes
the  structure  of  unemployment  by  duration,  age  and  gender,  which  has  important
implications for the design of income support systems for the unemployed.
Table 1:  GDP Index  (1989 = 100)
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000
Bulgaria  90.9  80.3  74.4  73.3  74.6  76.2  68.5  63.7  65.9  65.9  69.5
Czech R.  98.8  87.4  84.6  85.1  87.8  93.4  96.9  97.2  95.0  95.0  98.1
Estonia  91.9  79.4  68.1  62.0  60.8  63.4  65.8  72.8  75.7  75.7  81.1
Hungary  96.5  1 85.0  82.4  181.9  84.3  1 85.5  86.6  90.6  95.2  98.1  101.7
Latvia  102.9  92.2  60.0  51.1  51.4  51.0  52.7  57.2  59.2  60.1  64.2
Lithuania  95.0  89.1  70.1  58.9  53.3  55.2  57.9  62.2  65.4  65.4  67.9
Poland  88.4  82.2  84.3  87.6  92.1  98.6  104.6  111.8  117.1  121.2  126.0
Romnnia  94.4  82.2  75.0  76.1  79.1  84.7  88.2  82.1  76.1  73.0  74.3
Slovakia  97.5  83.3  77.9  75.0  78.6  84.1  89.6  95.4  99.6  101.4  103.6
Slovenia  95.3  86.8  82.0  84.3  88.8  92.5  95.7  100.1  104.0  107.6  112.5
Source:  Central European Countries'  Employment and Labour Market  Review,  EUROSTAT, Theme  3,
1999-1;
CANSTAT Statistical Bulletin No.2/2002.
2.1  Responses of  employment  to output reductions
Reductions  of output invariably reduced  employment and increased  both the number
of  the  unemployed  and  inactive  individuals.  But  the  mode  of  adjustment  differed
significantly across  countries,  both  in terms  of how  strongly  employment  was  affected and
which  non-employment  destinations  were  chosen.  While  all  countries  reduced  their
employment  by less than they reduced  their output,  there are significant  differences  among
them.  Mencinger  (2000)  estimates  that in  1989-97  period,  the  elasticity  of employment  to
3output was high in Bulgaria,  amounting to 0.9; in a medium range of 0.4 to 0.6 in Hungary,
Poland,  Slovakia  and  Slovenia;  and  low  in  the  Czech  Republic,  amounting  to  0.3  (his
estimate  for Romania  is also  low but insignificant,  and he finds  low elasticities  for Russia
and Ukraine  as well).
Why are these elasticities  so different?  Apparently,  some countries  used the approach
of "job preservation,"  that is,  of keeping  open  unemployment  low  by discouraging  labor
shedding,  thus  increasing  hidden  unemployment.  For  example,  Slovenia  used  explicit
"employment  preservation"  subsidies  to  prevent  increases  in  unemployment.  Another
example  is  Russia,  where  in  the  early, transition  period,  various  practices  (resulting  from
peculiar corporate  governance)  kept unemployment at a low level (see,  for example,  Gaddy
and Ickes, 1999).
Although a thorough evaluation  of "job preservation"  approaches  is outside the  scope
of this  paper,  we  provide  a  few  comments.  While  job  preservation  is  appealing  from  a
fairness  point  of  view,  it  may  have  serious  efficiency  consequences.  For  example,
Haltiwanger and Vodopivec  (2002) and Vodopivec  (2000) find a much faster job reallocation
pace and even more favorable outcomes for young workers in Estonia, a well-known  radical
reformer,  than in Slovenia.  On a more general  level,  Caballero  and Hammour  (2000) show
that labor reallocation - the central issue of the transition - can be greatly hampered by poor
institutions.  Such institutions  may reduce cooperation  among factors of production  and, by
favoring some of them over others, contribute to underemployment  of the factor which reaps
disproportionate  gains,  impeding  technological innovations  and job creation.  Literature  on
job  creation  and  destruction  also  shows  that  in order  for a market  economy  to  function
properly, many jobs (perhaps  10 percent of the total stock a year) must be destroyed and new
jobs  created;  and  that  these  newly  created  jobs  are  much  more  productive  than  those
destroyed (see, for example, Davis et al, 1996).
It is important  to bear  in mind,  however,  that the  analysis of stocks,  and  even  of
worker flows independent of their driving forces,  canmot be taken as a basis for evaluation of
the success  of labor market  adjustment.  Interestingly,  Russia's  labor market  adjustnent in
the early 1990s has been praised by Layard and Richter (1994).  They point to a high hiring
rate as a cause of low inflow into unemployment and to the significant changes in the sectoral
4structure of employment.  But such a positive  evaluation may be reversed once the extremely
low job creation  rates of Russia  are  taken into  account  (see Acquisti  and  Lehmann,  1998).
Indeed,  the  rate  of unemployment  is  not  a  good  proxy  for  the  scale  of worker  and  job
reallocation:  the same rate of unemployment  is consistent  with  very different  labor market
characteristics,  and  thus,  with  a  dynamic  or  a  static  labor  market  (see  Blanchard  and
Portugal,  1998,  for  the  comparison  of the  U.S.  and Portugal).  Moreover,  note  that  large
worker  flows  do  not necessarily  mean  that labor  is being  reallocated  - that  is,  that jobs  are
being destroyed  in one firm or sector and created in another. Undoubtedly,  developments  on
the  job  creation  and job  destruction  front  are  crucial  for evaluating  the  success  of labor
reallocation in transition economies.2
2.2  Responses of unemployment to employment reductions
Above we showed that the output decline led to substantial reductions in employment  -
were  these  reductions  absorbed  by  increases  in  unemployment  or  in  inactivity,  or  both?
Interestingly,  there are  considerable  differences  in the  intensity  of the use of each  channel
across  transition  economies.  In  some,  adjustment  affecting  unemployment  has  been  less
intense:  for example,  in the Czech Republic,  Estonia, and Hungary,  unemployment increased
by 27 to 42 per reduction of employment by 100.  In contrast, the reduction of employment
by  100  resulted  in  a  much  larger  increase  in  unemployment  in  some  other  transition
economies - by 85  in Poland,  by  75  in Bulgaria,  and by 66 in Slovakia  (Blanchard,  1997,
p.1 1).  In  Slovenia,  there  has  been  virtually  no  increase  in  survey  unemployment  (but
registered  unemployment  increased  by 44  per reduction  of employment  by  100  over  the
period 1990-2001).
The ability to channel redundant  workers to inactivity depended  partly on the scale of
adjustment;  obviously, small adjustments  could have been achieved by regular outflows from
the labor market.  But outflows  to  inactivity were undoubtedly  partly  policy driven:  some
countries  tried  to  avoid  unemployment  by  sponsoring  early  retirement  or  allowing  more
2 There is a substantial  (and growing)  anount  of literature  on this topic: see Acquisti  and Lehmnn (1998)  for
evidence  on  Russia;  Bilsen  and Konings  (1998)  on  Bulgaria,  Hungary,  and  Romnania;  Bojnec  and  Konings
(1998)  on  Slovenia;  Haltiwanger  and  Vodopivec  (2002)  on  Estonia,  and  Konings,  Lehmann,  and  Schaffer
(1996) on Poland.
5workers  to withdraw  from  the labor  market by claiming  disability benefits.  As  shown  in
Figure  1, Poland,  Hungary,  Slovakia  and  Slovenia  have  spent  considerable  resources  on
promoting  early  retirement  (in  1992,  their  expenditures  on  early  retirement  reached  0.8
percent  of GDP).  As  we  show  below  for  Slovenia,  the  early retirement  route,  however,
proved both fiscally expensive  as well as ineffective  as far  as promoting the employment of
young workers.
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Source:  Employment  Outlook,  OECD,  various  issues,  Yearly Work Report of Employment  Office of
Slovenia, various issues.
Experenmce  wMt1h early retnyemenat:  these'  of  0  $oDvemfi  To protect workers from the
increased  hardship brought  about by transition  reforms  - and possibly to "make  room"  for
the -employment of young workers  - the Slovenian govermenet  subsidized  early retirement.
Women qualified  for early retirement  at the age of §°,  and men at the age of 55, five  years
before  their respective regular retirement  ages.  Those who  qualified  had to have sufficient
years  of service  and  buy missing  pension  credits  - at  a price  that had  no  relation  to  the
actuarially fair price.  As a rule, employers paid the missing pension credits for early retirees,
and the government compensated employers for about 50 percent of the costs.
Early retirement was certainly a good deal for workers: pension levels for early retirees
were only slightly reduced (by one percentage point of fall pension for each missing year of
pension  credits), with the reduction  effective only until reaching  normal retirement  age.  In
6addition, pension levels for newly retired workers tended to be better protected  from inflation
than  were  wages,  and  for  some  groups  of workers,  pension  levels  at  retirement  even
exceeded  wages received immediately before retirement.
It thus  comes  as no surprise  that the early retirement policy was  very effective.  The
proportion of those  employed at the beginning of the year who  retired during  the year rose
significantly in both 1990 and 1991.  For example, the proportion of women with 30-34 years
of experience who retired during the year increased from 0.164 in 1989 to 0.425 in 1990 and
0.40 in  1991  (see Orazem and Vodopivec,  1995). The story for men is the same, but with a
five year lag. The sharp increase began five years earlier in the experience profile  for women
than  men,  coinciding  with  the  five  year  difference  in  minimum  age  and  experience
requirements  for the receipt of pensions.  This produced dramatic  employment reductions for
workers  in  the  highest  experience  groups  (measured  by  the  length  of total  employment),
accompanied by equally dramatic wage  increases for persons  of these groups who remained
working.  By 1992, employment of males with 30-34 years of experience  fell to 72 percent of
the 1987  level, while  employment  for those  with  35 or more years  of experience  fell to  33
percent of the 1987  level.  Similar reductions were seen with women's employment,  but they
began five years earlier, at 25-29 years of experience.
Apart  from being  expensive,  the early retirement  program  failed  to "make  room" for
the employment  of young workers.  The share of workers under  the age of 20 fell from 34
percent  in the  late  1980s  to  1.5  percent in  1992  (Vodopivec,  2002).  Estonia offers  a sharp
contrast:  although the govemment did not sponsor early retirement (and pensionable age was
even  increased  early  in  the  transition),  the  share  of employed  workers  under  20  years
increased  early in the transition  (from 3.1  in  1989  to 3.5  in  1993).  Obviously,  employment
opportunities of young workers  are affected by other, much more powerful forces than those
induced by early retiremnent - the forces  connected  with job creation  in general.3 In fact, if
3  Employment  protection  legislation  - the  Slovenian  one  being much  stricter  than the  Estonian  one -- is a
plausible candidate to account for job creation and destruction.  Namely, the model of Blanchard (1998) shows
that  higher  employment  protection  costs  lead  to  impaired  access  to jobs  for  narginal  groups  of workers
(productivity of these workers  before hiring is not easily revealed and therefore their probability of being hired
in the presence of large firing costs is lower).
7younger  workers  are  complements  for  - and  not  substitutes  of - older  workers,  early
retirement programs may have a negative  effect on the employment of young workers.
2.3 The smrge of ueploymera
Perhaps the most dramatic development  in the labor market of transition economies has
been  the  emergence  of large-scale  unemployment.  Below  we  examine  the  evolution  of
overall  unemployment  as  well  as  its  structure  by  age,  gender,  region,  and  duration  of
unemployment  spells.  From  an income  support perspective,  not only the level, but also the
structure  of unemployment  is  of interest:  different  groups  may have  different  escape  rates
from unemployment, and, hence, may require specific policy responses.
$oirvey  nmemlpoymeima.  Labor force surveys  show persistent  and,  in some  countries,
very high  levels of unemployment  (Table 2).4  With a few exceptions  (the Czech Republic,
Slovenia, and Romania),  unemployment rose to double digit levels.  In counties with a large
initial  increase,  unemployment  started to  fall in the  second half of the  1990s (but in Poland
and Slovakia,  it than again increased by 2000).
Table 2:  memplloymemt Riee  Labon  IFource Snveys)
1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000
Bulgaria  21.4  20.5  14.7  13.7  15.0  16.0  14.1  18.7
Czech R.  3.9  3.8  4.1  3.9  4.8  6.5  8.5  8.8
Estonia  1.5  3.7  6.5  7.6  9.7  10.0  9.7  9.6  11.8  13.5
Hungary  9.3  11.9  10.7  10.2  9.9  8.7  7.8  7.0  6.6
Latvia  18.9  18.3  14.4  13.8  13.9  14.4
Lithuania  17.4  17.1  16.4  14.1  13.5  10.4  15.9
Poland  13.7  14.9  16.5  15.2  14.3  11.5  10.6  12.6  16.6
Romania  8.2  8.0  6.7  6.0  6.3  6.9  7.7
Slovakda  12.2  13.7  13.1  11.1  11.6  11.9  16.0  19.1
Slovenia  7.3  8.3  9.1  9.0  7.4  7.3  7.4  7.9  7.5  7.1
Source: Same as Table 1.
We  rely  on  survey  data,  because  data  on  registered  unemployment  is  likely to  be  distorted.  There  are
numerous  country  specific  incentives  to  register  which  invalidate  cross-section  comparisons,  and  these
incentives may vary through time, which also makes comparisons  through time  unattractive.
8Evidence  suggests that a significant increase in unemployment  in a transition  economy
can  be  postponed,  but  not  avoided.  The  Czech  Republic,  for  example,  initially  kept
unemployment  low, but in the second half of the  1990s struggled with the consequences  of
postponed  microeconomic  restructuring  and  excessive  income  increases.  Sirnilarly,  the
relatively low unemployment  of Romania largely reflects  a lack of enterprise  restructuring
and labor hoarding.
Registered  unemployment.  Most  of the  transition  countries  experienced  a  rapid
increase  in  the registered  unemployment  rate  to  two digit levels  (Table  3).  While  in  some
countries  the  rates  in  the  second  half of the  1990s  started  to  decline  (Hungary,  Latvia,
Romania,  and  Slovenia),  in  some  others  they  grew  throughout  the  1990s  (the  Czech
Republic, Lithuania and Estonia).
Table 3: Registered Unemployment  Rate
1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000
Bulgaria  11.1  15.3  16.4  12.8  11.1  12.5  13.7  12  14.1  20.8
Czech R.  4.1  2.6  3.5  3.2  2.9  3.5  5.2  7.5  8.4  8.8
Estonia  5.0  5.1  5.0  5.5  4.6  4.7.  6.7  6.6
Hungary  7.4  12.3  12.1  10.4  10.4  10.5  10.4  9.1  9.7  9.0
Latvia  0.6  3.9  8.7  16.7  18.1  19.4  14.8  13.8  10.7  9.3
Lithuania  0.3  1.3  4.4  3.8  6.2  7  5.9  6.4  7.7  11.4
Poland  11.8  13.6  16.4  16.0  14.9  13.2  10.5  10.4  12.7  14.4
Romania  3.0  8.2  10.4  10.9  9.5  6.6  8.8  10.3  9.2  8.9
Slovakia  12.2  13.7  13.1  11.1  11.6  11.9  18.9  20.6
Slovenia  8.2  11.5  14.4  14.4  13.9  13.9  14.4  14.5  11.6  10.3
Source:  EBRD,  Transition  Report  1999,  Employment  and  Labour  Market  in  Central  European
Countries  2001/2, EUROSTAT,  Theme 3, 2001.
It  seems  that  the  generosity  of  benefits  affects  the  rate  of  registration  of  the
unemployed  at  employment  offices.  For example,  in  Estonia,  where  the  level  of benefits
until 2003 was extremely low, the registered  unemployment rate was much below the survey
rate of unemployment.  In contrast, Slovenia seems to have introduced the opposite
9incentives. 5 The rate of registered unemployment  remained fairly steady during 1995-
98  at around  14 percent - the highest registered level of unemployment  in the  10 transition
countries  in our sample  and 6-7 percentage points above the survey rate of unemployment,
but it seems that the 1998  reform of unemployment  benefit program and stricter monitor of
non-recipients  helped  to  reduce  the  number  of registered  unemployed  in  the  post-1998
period.  The discrepancy  between the survey and register numbers  is attibutable mainly to
the group of registered unemployed who are not considered unemployed  according to survey
criteria.  In 1999, more than half of the registered unemployed did not qualify as unemployed
by  survey  criteria,  70  percent  of them  because  they  did  not  actively  search  for  a job
(Employment Office of Slovenia, 2000).
2A4 &SFtMCMe o  MmemaPlymew
What are  the demographic  and other characteristics  of the unemployed?  Given their
low mobility,  how many of them  are  long-term  unemployed?  Are  young and  old workers
disproportionately represented  among the unemployed?  What is the share of women among
the  unemployed?  How  high are  regional  disparities  in unemployment  rates?  All  these
aspects  have  an  important  bearing  on  the  design  of income  support  programs  for  the
unemployed.
Lomg-term  unmemipfoyminet.  Apart from the high levels of unemployment,  long-term
unemployment  has  also  become  a  serious  problem  across  many  European  transition
economies.  During the  period  1993-2000,  the  share of the  long-term  unemployed  ranged
from a third to more than half, and this share in the majority of countries increased in the late
1990s (Table 4).
ln Slovenia, incentives to register are very diverse.  As in other countries, registration is a prerequisite for the
receipt of unemployment insurance  benefits  (which consists of cash payments and payments  of social security
contnbutions  for old-age  and  health  insurance)  and of employment  office  services  (counseling,  training,  and
erployment  subsidies).  But in  Slovenia,  registration  at the employment  office  also brings  protection  from
layoffs for a working spouse; reimbursement of moving expenses  connected with reemployment;  eligibility for
health  care  services  after unerployment  insurance  eligibility expires;  advantages  in accessing  social  housing;
ability  to  enroll  in  evening  post-elementary  education  (only  day-time  enrollment  is  permitted  otherwise);
subsidies for child care and eligibility for child allowances;  and eligibility for voluntary old-age insurance.  In
addition,  newly declared  disabled persons  waiting to be  positioned to new worldng places that correspond  to
their disability  also have  to register with employment offices  (in early 2000,  they constituted about  10 percent
of all registered unemployed).
10Table 4: Shares of Long-term Unemployed*
1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000
Bulgaria  53.8  60  65.6  59.9  57.6  54.4  58.3  53.0
Czech R  27.6  29.5  36.6  50.0
Estonia  28.1  39.6  31.8  55.3  45.8  45  42.2  47.3
Hungary  32.2  41.3  45.6  49.8  46.5  44.3  47.9  47.9
Latvia  56  53.0  55.9
Lithuania  38  38.8  52.4
Poland  33.5  38.6  40.5  40  39.1  37.9  41.6  44.6
Romania  44.3  45.2  49.2
Slovakia  30.2  41.6  53.1  52.7  51.1  49.7  47.6  54.7
Slovenia  54.8  62.1  59.0  53.8  59.6  57.1  41.8  62.7
Source:  Central European Countries'  Employment  and Labour Market Review,  EUROSTAT,  Theme  3,
1999-1;  OECD:  Country  Surveys,  Economic  Outlook;  Employment  and  Labour  Market  in  Central
European  Countries 2001/2, EUJROSTAT,  Theme 3, 2001.
*Unemployment duration exceeding  12 months.
One of the reasons  for the  high increase  in the proportion of long-term  unemployed
workers  has  been  the  low  probability  of transition  from  unemployment,  particularly  to
employment.  Boeri  (1996)  shows  that this probability  is much  lower in transition than in
OECD  countries.  Individuals  who  become  unemployed  may  encounter  a host  of factors
which act to lower the probability of transition  from long-term unemployment,  particularly to
employment.  Labor  shedding  unmatched  by sufficient job  creation  contributed  to  a higher
incidence of long-term unemployment in all economies;  in addition, generous  unemployment
benefits may have played a role in some of them as well (see below).  A large proportion  of
the long-term unemployed  are relatively unskilled workers (European Commission,  1999).
Structure of unemployment  by age.  Young workers faced more serious impediments
in securing and maintaining employment  than other groups of workers,  including those  over
55  years  of age.  For  all  countries,  the unemployment  rates  for youth,  that  is,  for  those
individuals  below 25 years of age, were substantially higher than the average unemployment
rates  (compare Tables  2 and  5),  with the  trends in the two being  quite similar.  The Czech
Republic was the only country that had single digit youth unemployment rate till  1997, but it
increased  to 17 percent by 2000.  In line with the falling average unemployment  rates in the
second half of the  1990s,  the youth unemployment  rate in Hungary, Romania  and Slovenia
was also  falling  The countries  with the  most sever youth unemployment  problem  in 2000
were Bulgaria, Poland,  and Slovakia.1993  1994  1995  1996  197  2998  2999  2000
Bulgaria  47.0  44.9  37.7  33.5  36.0  36.0  31.3  39.4
Czech R.  7.7  7.9  7.2  8.6  12.4  16.6  17.0
Estonia  11.0  11.6  14.1  16.0  14.4  14.5  22.1  23.7
Hungary  21.3  19.4  18.6  18.0  15.9  13.5  12.3  12.3
Latvia  30.1  29.0  24.9  27.1  23.4  21.2
Lithuania  32.1  31.6  27.4  26.2  22.9  21.3  27.5
Poland  30.0  32.5  31.2  28.5  24.8  23.3  29.6  35.7
Romania  22.5  20.6  20.2  18  18.3  17.3  17.8
Slovakia  25.7  27.6  24.8  20.6  22.4  23.5  32.0  36.9
Slovenia  24.2  22.2  18.8  18.8  17.6  18.3  18.5  16.4
Source:  Same as Table 1.
* Unemployment rates of  workers below 25 years of age (according to labor force surveys).
The share of unemployed  workers older than 55 years in total unemployment has been
low (see Table 6).  In all countries of our sample except  Latvia,  this share has been below 10
percent throughout the  1993-2001  period,  and  several  countries have managed  to keep this
share below 5 percent (Hungary, Poland, Romania,  Slovalda and Slovenia).
Talbe 6: Mhanres  of 1LmemmpDoyed  clldeir  3Enm  05 i  lmepRoy  emt
1993  2994  1995  1996  1997  2998  2999  2800  2881
Bulgaria  6.6  5.9  4.5  4.2  3.8  5.0  4.6  5.4  7.9
Czech R.  8.2  6.8  6.3  8.5  6.4  5.4  5.3  5.3  5.7
Estonia  6.0  7.6  8.2  8.2  7.8  7.6  7.5  8.8  9.6
Hungary  5.2  4.5  3.1  3.4  4.1  3.9  2.1  3.0  3.6
Latvia  16.6  11.3  9.1  8.2  7.2  8.8  11.5
Lithuania  4.7  4.9  5.0  7.7  7.6
Poland  4.4  3.7  3.8  3.8  3.8  4.4  4.7  4.0  3.6
Romania  1.6  1.9  1.1  1.0  0.9  0.9  1.3  1.6
Slovakia  3.2  2.7  3.0  2.6  3.0  2.8  3.1  3.1
Slovenia*  3.5  4.5  4.2  5.3  2.4  2.1  2.8  4.4  4.9
Source: ILO, LABORSTA, National Statistical Offices of Estonia and Slovenia.
*Low reliability because of the small proportion of individuals older than 55 in the sample.
$tn  Uire of  melmpRoymemt  1by germdeir  In most countries, the unemployment rate for
women  is higher than  for men,  with the  notable  exception  of Hungary  where  the  female
unemployment  rate  was  consistently  and  significantly  below the male  unemployment  rate
between  1993-1998.  Slovenia,  Estonia,  and  Latvia also  reported,  at times,  lower  female
unemployment  rates  than  for males  (European  Commission,  1999).  But women's share in
12unemployment in  most  countries  is lower  than men's  (except  in  the  Czech  Republic  and
Poland).  The lowest women's share is in Hungary, with around 40 percent (Table 7).
Table 7:  Share of Women in Unemployment
1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000
Bulgaria  48.3  47.0  48.1  47.4  47.8  47.0  46.7  46.0
Czech R.  55.9  53.7  52.9  52.7  54.6  56.5  53.2  53.6
Estonia  47.7  49.0  42.7  43.9  45.4  43.3  42.5  41.3
Hungary  39.1  43.3  37.2  39.1  38.6  39.5  40.1  39.3
Latvia  44.3  45.6  48.5  48.4  45.7  44.8
Lithuania  47.1  44.0  43.2  41.4
Poland  51.3  51.2  50.9  51.8  54.0  53.3  49.2  52.0
Romania  49.7  49.6  49.5  48.5  44.1  41.6  43.0
Slovakia  43.8  46.0  46.9  50.7  49.0  47.3  45.4  44.7
Slovenia  42.3  43.5  44.3  44.9  48.6  46.8  47.1  47.0
Source: Same as Table 1.
In  summary,  the  low  propensity  of the  unemployed  to  take  jobs  has  produced  a
stagnant  pool  of unemployed,  with  a  large  share  of long-term  unemployed.  Among  the
unemployed  there  is  also  a  disproportionate  share  of young  workers.  Due  to  a loss  of
earnings, the unemployed may experience  a sharp decline  in their consumption  expenditure,
particularly if they are not compensated  for this loss.  We focus on income support programs
in the rest of the paper.
3.  INCOME  SUPPORT PROGRAMS FOR THE UNEMPLOYED
Prior to  the transition,  "open"  unemployment  in  East European  countries  - with the
exception  of Yugoslavia - was virtually non-existent.  Consequently,  at the beginning of the
transition,  income  support programs for the unemployed  were unavailable.6 In all countries,
the  network  of employment  offices  existed,  but  these  offices  primarily  focused  on  labor
exchange  for employed workers  and were unprepared  to offer services  for large numbers of
unemployed.
Anticipating the emergence of widespread unemployment,  in the early  1990s (as early
as  1989  in Poland),  all transition  countries  enacted  legislation  for the provision  of income
support for the unemployed,  using the West as their blueprint.  This income  support included
13unemployment  benefit  and  social  assistance  programs,  as  well  as  active  labor  market
programs ranging from training to subsidized employment programs to labor-intensive public
works programs. From the incipient stages, both unemployment benefit and social assistance
programs  have  undergone  several,  often  radical  reforms  largely  aimed  at  curbing
expenditures  in the face of an upsurge in unemployment and severe fiscal constraints,  as well
as  to  reduce  the  work  disincentives  created  by  such  programs.  Reforms  commonly
comprised of tighter eligibility requirements  for the receipt and maintenance of benefits, and
a reduction in the length of the maximum potential duration of entitlement.
In this  section, we first describe the rules of these systems in transition  economies and
discuss  issues  arising in their implementation.  We  then discuss  the costs of these systems
and compare them to the costs of unemployment benefit programs in OECD economies.
3.1 ]Desc4:pdon of  incomDse sMppoFt  sys9emsJbv 9e uOem§oy
Below we focus on unemployment benefits as they are the primary program of income
support for the unemployed,  but we also discuss social assistance  as an increasing number of
the unemployed participate in this program as well.
UEme mnpoyment beimeIths
Similar  to  most  OECD  countries,  unemployment  benefit  programs  in  transition
countries  are  typically mandatory  and cover the majority of emnployed persons,  irrespective
of industry  or  occupation  (the  most  notable  exception  being the  self-employed).  Benefit
levels  are  earnings-related  and  the  duration of entitlement  is tied  to previous  employment
history, but at the same time, benefit floors ensure that the benefits of those at the bottom of
the wage distribution do not fall beneath an officially detennmined minimum.  In addition, as a
significant deviation  from the insurance principle, some special groups such as school  eavers
(in the Czech and Slovak Republics, Estonia, Poland, and Romania) and others are entitled to
benefits  at  fixed rates  (Boeri,  1997).  Moreover,  after eligibility to eamings-related  benefits
under unemployment  insurance  expires,  the  unemployed  may  continue  to receive benefits
under a means tested follow-up program  called unemployment  assistance.  Because it pays a
6The exceptions were Yugoslavia,  where unemployment insurance existed since the early 1970s, and Hungary,
where benefits were offered to redundant workers dismissed in mass layoffs since 1986 (Boeri,  1997).
14flat rate  and is financed  from general revenues, Estonia's  program was sometimes classified
as unemployment assistance (Vroman, 2002).7  Some of the salient institutional features of
unemployment benefit systems of transition countries are detailed below (they are
summarized  in Table 8)
7 In one of the most radical reforms implemented by a transition economy,  Estonia substantially revamped  its
benefit program in 2001, and the  first unemployment  benefits under the new regime were paid out in January
2003.  The  program  introduced  a proper,  mandatory  public unemployment  insurance  scheme  financed  from
contributions by workers  and employers.  It is expected that under the new program unemployment benefits will
increase by several  times,  particularly  for better paid workers  (in  contrast to  the flat-fee  rate  of the previous
program, the new benefits are earnings-related).
15'IPahe 0:  IMgoin  eDauires of Un¢moDoyment  1Menefl1  Systens In CEEVC
(Latest Legl.Slilon  In  3o1d)
Date  Reference  Required min  Max duration of  Relation to individual's gross earnings  Unemployment  benefit  levels  (minimum  and
period  employment  benefits  maximum, expressed  in % of minimum wage)
record
Bulgaria  1989  12 months  6 months  6 months'  100% of last monthly wage for first  100%C
month, then  10%  less for next 5
monthsb
1991  12 months  6 months  12 months  Equal to minimum wage
1992  12 months  6 months  12 months  60%d  90%  140%
A1990  22 months  9 months  12 months  60 %d  85%  140%
Czech R.  1991  3 years'  12 months  12 months  60% first 6 months  none,  but  70%  of  minimum  living  standard
50%  following 6 months  (MLS)  if not employed before
(70% in case of retraining  course)
1992  6 months  60% first 6 months  none,  but  70%  of 150-180%f
50% following 6 months  minimum  wage  if not
(70% in case of retraining  course)  employed before
1996  3  yearse  12 months  6 months  60% first 6 months  none,  but  70%  of 150-180% of MLSf
50% following 6 months  MLS  if not  employed
(70% in case of retraining course)  before
1990  3 yearse  12 months  6 mounths  §0%  flrst 6 months  none  (but  70%  of  T50-180% of MLST
40%  foflowing 6 months  FtLS oT not enmpRoyed
(60%  Dn  ease of retrnlnnp conurse)  beore)
lstonln  11991  12 months  180 days  6 months  Flat rate, detenrined as 60% of
minimum wage
1995  12 months  180 days  6 months (3 months  Flat rate, determined  as 60% of
extensions  minimum wage
considered on
individual basis)
2001  24 months  12 months  12 months  50%  n  tOhe frst 100 days,  40%  of  the  overage 150  percent  of  the
(effective  of the  reeelpt, 40%  therenfter  wage  average wage
2003)
16Table 8:  Main features of unemployment  benefit systems in CEEC (cont'd)
(latest legislation  in bold)
Date  Reference  Required minim  Maximum duration  Relation to individual's gross earnings  Unemployment benefit levels (minimum and
period  employ,ment  of benefits  maximum, expressed  in % of minimum wage)
record
Hungary  1989  3 years'  18 months  24 monthsg  70%  first 6 months  80% since 1990i  300%
60% following 6 months
45% following 12 months
1991  4 years  360 days  70% first half of entitlement  period  100%i
50% second half period
1992  70% first half of entitlement  period  none  200%
50% second half period
1993  4 years  90 days  360 days  70% during phase 1  8600 fiorints  18000  fiorints during
50% during phase lilh  phase I
1500 fiorints during
phase ll
1997  4 years  90 days  360 days  65%h  90%  of minimum  180% of minimum
old-age  pension  old-age pension
Latvla  1993  6 months  90% of minimum wage (70%  for new  70 % of minimum  140 % of minimum
entrants)  wage  wage
Litlhuania  1993  6 months  70 %, later reduced to 60 % and 50%
Poland  1989  None  None  None  70%  first 3 months  100%  average wage
60%  following 6 months
45% afler 9 months
1992-94  1 year'  180 daysi  12 months  2  36% of national average wage  none  none
years in exceptional
cases
1997  18 months  I year  18 months  flat rate amount paid at 378,2cz  none  none
Romania  1996  1 year  6 months  9 months  50-60% for 9 months  75-80%  200%
1 year
1998  1 year  1 year  9 monthsk  50-60% for 9 months  76-92%  210%
17'1I ble 0:  MOnun  featnires of  emelpRoymeunt  beneffe systemns  mD  CIEE  (¢cont'd)
(mlnest  RegsIgtmom  !nn bo2d)
Date  Reference  Required  minim  Maximum duration  Relation to individual's gross earnings  Unemployment benefit levels (minimum  and
period  employment  of benefits  maximum,  expressed in % of minimum wage)
record
SD0VEk IR.  1991  3  years  12  months  12 months  65% first 6 months  none  None
60%  following 6 months
70% during retraining
1992  6 months  65%  first 6 months  45%1  150-180%f
60% following 6 months
70% during retraining
1995  3 years  12  months  12 months  60% first 3 months  nonem  150%
50% following 9 months
1997  3 years  12  montas  12  monthDs  60%  flirst 3 months  nonenn  150%
50%  foluowlng 9 months
SgovenOl  1996  18 months  9-12 months  24  months  70% first 3 months  80%p  320%p
60%  following 3 montlhs0
1990  10 months  9-12 months  24 months  70%  flrst 3 msonths  100%  300%
60%  ofolowing 3 months 0
Plus an additional  three months of unemployment assistance.
b Unemployment  insurance equal to the minimum wage plus  20% of the difference between  the avcragc wagc and thc minimum wagc
Since October 1990.
d Average of last six  months' wage;  an additional  15%  is  awarded  upon  completion of a training course.
e Not required  if enrolled in  a training course.
'The recipient receives 180% if enrolled in  a training course.
' One year until January  1990 when it was extended  to two years.
h Unemployed earning from casual  work not more than  half of the minimum wage per month remain entitled to full Ut
'If previous earnings were lcss than minimum wagc then the benefit is set equal  to previous camings.
Introduced in September  1990.
h Some of the unemployment  benefit  exhaustees (after 9 months) qualify for a SUPPORT ALLOWANCE  PROGRAM  for an additional  (maximum)  18 months. This program
is  means tested, 0nd the level of allowance  is  60%  of the level of tnemployment  benefit they initially receive
'Minimum  applies only to  first time unemployed  and school  leavers and is paid  for a period of six  months.
Net monthly wage if lower than the minimum pension income.
n First three months paid  at 70%, then remaining months paid at 60% of average  wage.
0 Recipients can  receive a supplement  for each family member  to raise the average  income  per family member  to 80% of the  gross min  wage.
P  As a percentage of the guaranteed minimum wage.
Sources:  Employment  Observatory,  no 8, OECD Short-term  Economic  Indicators.  Sources and Definitions,  national  labour ministries;  Rutkowski  (1996),  Micklewright  and
Nagy (1996),  Terrell,  Erbenova and Sorm, (1996), Vodopivec  (1995), Lubvyova  and Ours (1996),  Kwiatkowski  (1998).
18Benefit  eligibility  requirements.  To qualify for benefit receipt, the unemployed must
register at the local  employment office and have  typically worked  in covered employment for
a minimum period of 9 to 12 months within a reference  period of 12 to 36 months, depending
on  the  country.  As  a  significant  exception,  Hungary  requires  the  minimum  employment
period of 90 days  in the 4 years preceding unemployment.  Workers  who quit are  either not
eligible  for  benefit  receipt  (e.g.,  the  Czech  Republic)  or  observe  a  waiting  period  (e.g.,
Bulgaria,  5 months; Hungary,  180 days; and Poland,  and Slovakia, 90 days).
Continuing  eligibility  typically  requires  claimants  to  be actively  seeking,  capable  of,
and available  for work.  Employment  offices  also  require the  claimant  be willing to  accept
suitable job  offers.  Furthermore,  some countries  (e.g.,  Poland)  also require claimants  to be
willing to  participate  in vocational  training  or public works  programs,  and  not collect  any
other  public  cash  transfers  at  the  same  time.  Non-compliance  with  these  requirements,
according to the legislation, results in disqualification.
Because  of the  low  level  of benefits,  transition  countries  often allow  for  a  significant
"eamings  disregard,"  that is, allow unemployment  benefit claimants  to eam and continue to
maintain benefit  eligibility.  In  Bulgaria,  for  instance,  an individual  can  continue  to  claim
unreduced  benefits  so  long  as  earnings  do  not  exceed  150 percent  the  official  minimum
wage.  Likewise, the maximum admissible  level of earnings is  100 percent  of the minimum
wage in Hungary  and 50 percent  in both Poland  and Romania.  Scarpetta  and Reutersward
(1994) express  concern that the widespread  under-reporting  of wages  may mean that some
claimants unfairly benefit at the expense  of those claimants  with the greatest need, resulting
in the poor allocation of funds.  This problem  is certainly being compounded  by increasing
participation rates in the informal economy.
Benefit  levels.  Benefits  are  usually  a  proportion  of  average  earnings  over  some
stipulated period of the most recent  employment  spell.  The initial  replacement  rate  ranges
between 50 and 70 percent of average gross earnings,  and is often degressive  over time.  For
example,  in Slovenia, the replacement rate is 70 percent in the first 3 months, followed by 60
percent  in the remaining months.  A notable exception  is Poland where  the benefit  level  is
not related  to previous earnings but rather  set at 36 percent the national  average wage;  until
2003,  a flat fee benefit set at a very low level  (below  10  percent  of the  average  wage)  was
19also in place  in Estonia.  Some countries  such as Bulgaria and the  Czech Republic  reward
those who  attend or complete training  courses  by offering them  a higher replacement  rate.
Benefit ceilings  and floors  are used to limit the range of benefits.  When present,  minimum
benefit levels are usually at either official minimum wage or slightly below (75-90 percent of
minimum  wage),  while  the  maximum  benefit  level  is  typically  at  150  percent  of the
minimuim  wage.  However,  the benefit  ceiling  exhibits greater  variation,  ranging  from  140
percent  in  Bulgaria  to  300  percent  in  Slovenia.  The  compression  of the  benefit  range,
particularly  the  establishment  of low  ceilings,  have  helped  contain  outlays.  In  addition,
benefit ceilings play an important redistributive role.
Under  increased  fiscal  pressures,  many  countries  have  found  it  hard  to  sustain  the
benefit levels as set at the introduction of the programs.  Several countries therefore  reduced
their unemployment  insurance replacement rates by the late  1990s (see Figure 2).
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Source:  Table 8.
*Average replacement rate in the first six months of benefit eligibility.  For Estonia, the benefit is flat, so
the rate is calculated as the level of the benefit divided by the average wage
Beimeflt  tiiniradtio.  With  the  exceptions  of Bulgaria  (and  since  2003,  Estonia),  all
transition countries  have reduced  the maximnum  potential duration of unemployment benefit
payments  (see  Figure  3).  As  it  stands,  the  maximum  potential  duration  of benefits  is
typically  12  months.  Notable  exceptions  include  the  Czech  Republic  (6  months)  ox  the
20lower side and Slovenia  (24 months) on the higher side. Durations  are often tied to the length
of previous  employment  history and  sometimes  to age (e.g.,  in Bulgaria,  Estonia,  Slovakia,
and Slovenia).  In  Slovenia,  for example,  the potential  benefit  duration for those with work
experience  of 1-5  years  is 3 months;  in contrast,  for those  with work  experience  above  25
years and older than 55 years, it is 24 months.
Figure 3: Maximum  Potential Duration of Unemployment  Insurance Payments,
Transition Economies,  Early and Late 1990s
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Source:  Table 8.
Special  rules.  As  in  OECD  countries,  transition  countries  give  special  dispensation  to
school leavers, the older unemployed,  and the unemployed in "high unemployment"  regions.
School  leavers  who  are unable  to find suitable jobs  within a certain  period of time (e.g.,  in
Bulgaria,  1 month, and in Poland, 4 months) are entitled to unemployment  benefits albeit for
a shorter  maximum  potential  duration  than  normal.  These  benefits  are provided  as  a  'job
search  allowance"  and  tend  to  be  some  percentage  of  the  official  minimum  wage  (e.g.,
Hungary,  75  percent  of  minimum  wage;  Bulgaria,  90  percent).  Options  for  the  older
unemployed  are more varied, but typically consist of extended  benefit durations  (see above).
Furthermore,  in many  countries,  those  individuals  that  are  a  couple  of years  away  from
retirement  age  are entitled to unemployment benefits until then.  Similarly, those individuals
unemployed  in regions where  the unemployment  rate is particularly  high or increasing  more
rapidly than the  national rate  are entitled  to extended  benefits.  For example,  in Poland,  the
21benefit duration is related to the relative incidence of unemployment  in the local labor market
and selectively to a number of other criteria.8
Fknamcihmg.  Similar  to  most  OECD  countries,  unemployment  benefits  are  financed
through extra-budgetary  means based on regular contributions  from employers (and some in
cases, employees).9 These contributions are channeled into designated funds which are often
used  to  finance  both  passive  (including  unemployment  benefits)  and  active labor  market
programs.  In Hungary,  a separate fund (the Solidarity Fund) was set up for unemployment
benefits  exclusively.  As  aforementioned,  all  countries  require  employers  to  contribute  for
unemployment  benefits, while only some require the same of employees (e.g., the Czech and
Slovak Republics).  The contribution rate for employers varies between  3 percent  of payroll
in  Poland  and  Slovakia  to  7  percent  in  Bulgaria  and  Hungary.  Where  applicable,  the
contribution rate for employees  are generally lower, either 1 or 2 percent of  wages.  The rates
for both employers  and employees  are comparable to that of OECD countries, but unlike the
latter, unemployment benefit programs in transition countries often fail to be financially self-
sufficient and consequently,  program  deficits have to be financed out of state budgets.  For
example,  in  1992, Hungary and Poland  financed  30 and  70 percent  of total unemployment
benefit costs respectively out of general tax revenues.
JnemnpBoy]naent  aMsssawtaee
In some transition countries,  unemployed workers who have exhausted their eligibility
to unemployment  insurance benefits  can  continue  to receive benefits under  a means-tested
program  called  unemployment  assistance.  For  example,  in  Slovenia,  unemployment
assistance  benefits  are  awarded  to individuals  whose actual  income per  family member  is
below  80  percent  of the  minimum  wage;  regardless  of the  gap,  the  same  amount  of 80
percent of the guaranteed wage is paid to all who qualify.  The benefit is paid for  15 months.
8  According  to  the  1996/97  act,  if the  local unemployment  rate is less  than  the  national  average,  then  the
resident unemployed is entitled to a maxinmm of 6 months; if the local  rate exceeds the national  average, the
resident unemployed  is entitled  to a maximum of 12 months;  and finally, if the local  rate is more than double
the  national  average,  and  the  unemployed  has  more  than  20 years  of service,  an unemployed  spouse,  and
supports  a child  of less  than  15  years  of age,  then  s/he  is  entitled  to  a  maximum  duration of  18  months
(Kwaitkowski,  1998).  8 One  notable  exception  is  Estonia where  unemployment  benefits  is financed  entirely
from general tax revenues.
9  One  notable  exception  is  Estonia  where  unemployment  benefits  is  financed  entirely  from  general  tax
revenues.
22Under unemployment  assistance,  the same rules for continuation of eligibility apply as under
unemployment  insurance.  Unemployment  assistance programs  are also in place in Bulgaria
and Hungary.
Social assistance.
Partly as  a  result of the  declining  coverage  rate  of unemployment  benefit programs,
transition  countries  have  relied  increasingly  on  social  assistance  - a  means-tested  income
support scheme of the last resort - to provide income  support to the unemployed.  Largely as
a  reflection  of its  growing  rolls,  expenditures  on  social  assistance,  although  less  than  1
percent of GDP generally,  has increased steadily in several countries.
Social  assistance  typically  takes the  form of guaranteed  minimum  income schemes
(e.g.,  the Czech and Slovak Republics,  Bulgaria, and Romania)  and are provided to all those
in need, including  the unemployed.  Apart from  these general  schemes,  some countries  also
offer  means-tested  assistance  programs  targeted  at  the  long-term  unemployed  (e.g.,
Hungary).  Social assistance  benefits  are generally  flat rate (usually at guaranteed  minimum
income  at  uniform  rates),  and  hence  lower  than  earnings-related  unemployment  benefits.
Minimum  social  assistance  benefit  levels  as a percent  of average  wages in  1997-98  varied
between  a low of 10.6 percent in Romania and a high of 32.5 percent  in the Slovak Republic.
Benefits  are  provided  indefinitely,  subject  to  regular  checks  to  determine  continuing
eligibility.  When maximum durations  are fixed as in Bulgaria and Slovenia (6 months),  and
Hungary (24 months), they tend to be renewable.  If unemployed,  social assistance claimants
must  also  actively  seek,  be  capable  of,  and  available  for  work.  Consequently,  social
assistance  claimants  have to report to employment  offices periodically,  although usually less
frequently than unemployment  benefit claimants.
Boeri (1998) notes that the transition  from earnings-related  unemployment benefits to
means-tested,  flat-rate  social  assistance  generally  involves  some  compensation  loss.
However,  since  social  assistance  benefits  take  into account  household  characteristics  (e.g.,
number of dependents),  it is conceivable  that low-income claimants with large families  may
receive  higher payments than  under unemployment benefits.  In addition,  the receipt  of in-
kind benefits may make social assistance more generous than unemployment  benefits.
23Notwithstanding  differences  in  the nominal  values  in  unemployment  benefits  and
social  assistance, high inflation in several countries have significantly reduced the generosity
(in real terms) of income  support  for the unemployed  as unemployment benefits  (and social
assistance  to  a  lesser  extent)  have  been  poorly  adjusted  for  inflation,  or  not  at  all.
Consequently,  in some countries,  unemployment benefits  have had to be "topped up"  with
social  assistance  in  order  to  ensure  that low-income  claimants  at  least  receive  the social
minima  (e.g., the Czech  and Slovak Republics).  This concern  aside,  as prices  stabilize,  the
transition  from unemployment benefits to social assistance may result in unemployment traps
as claimants  (especially  those  with  large  families  and  no other  eamers)  may prefer  social
assistance benefits (often with in-kind provisions such as housing or free meals) to jobs, the
majority of which tend to be low-wage  (Boeri,  1997).  Even if the adverse  effects  on work
incentives  can be addressed, the transition  from unemployment  benefits  to social assistance
necessarily  involves  an  increased  administrative  burden  as  a  result  of  the  additional
requirement of means-testing.
3.2 lmplem7aextad  ss$$es
The  task  of building  administrative  capacity  to provide  employment  services  to  the
unemployed  - including  unemployment  benefits  - has  been  quite  challenging.  With  the
rapid  growth  of  benefit  claimants,  employment  offices,  often  understaffed  and
underequipped,  came under tremendous stress.  Information systems on benefit delivery had
to be introduced  from  scratch,  and an integrated  information  system  on delivery of all cash
benefits  still  remains  a  remote  goal  in  all  transition  economies.  Furthermore,  with
employment  offices handling both active and passive programs,  the monitoring  of claimant
compliance suffered.  The two roles - helping to find a job and monitoring eligibility - were
often incompatible.  Relatedly,  in several  countries  unemployment  benefit programs had to
be amended  as  it became  increasingly  clear that they were too  generous  to be  sustainable
over the long-term - or that  legislation did not provide an  adequate  basis for administering
these benefits.
There  are  numerous  difficulties  in  making  usual  conditions  for  benefit  eligibility
"'operational"  in any  country.  First, how  should  one monitor  "availability  for work?"  A
24recent  attempt  by  Slovenia  requires  benefit  recipients  to  make  themselves  available  for
contactirig  by employment offices  for three hours per day - but this  arrangement,  aimed  at
curbing  informal  employment,  has  not  produced  desired  results  (see  below).  Second,  the
requirement  of "actively seeking  employment"  cannot be easily incorporated  into legislation.
What  is  reasonable  to  expect  from  the  unemployed  may  well  depend  on  individual
circumstances  (such  as  skills,  qualifications,  experience,  and  also  the  length  of
unemployment  spell),  as  well  as employment  prospects  in  the  local  labor  market.  Third,
additional problems are involved in defining a "suitable job", and with limiting the amount of
work which may be undertaken without affecting the level or receipt of the benefit.
The task of monitoring eligibility is even more difficult  in transition  economies.  First,
adjusting benefit  legislation to suit local  conditions  and norms takes  time (frequent changes
in transition  economies  attest to that).  Until legislative  loopholes  and deficiencies  are fixed,
fertile  grounds  exist  for  both  "type  I  errors"  (unjustified  exclusions  from  benefits,  for
example, of workers whose employers did not pay benefit contributions),  as well as "type I
errors"  (too  easy access  to benefits,  for example,  by persons  who  actually  work).  Second,
transition  economies  offer  lucrative  employment  opportunities  in  a  thriving  infornal
economy, which raises the costs of monitoring.  And third, many of the unemployed  believe
they  are entitled  to benefits  - and  this  sentiment  is  sometimes  shared  with  counselors  at
employment offices.' 0
The task of monitoring eligibility is also hampered by the transitional economies'  weak
monitoring and enforcement  capacity.  These  economies  lack the technology,  resources,  and
often  also the political  will to monitor and enforce  existing laws."  For example,  Bardasi  et
al (2001)  report that the proportion of benefit recipients who were actually searching for jobs
is below  50 percent  in Slovenia and ranges  from 60 to 90 percent  for the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia.  They report that these proportions are fall dramatically when
one  considers  active  job  search  only  (defined  as  any  method  other  than  visiting  the
employment  office):  the proportion  drops to about 25 percent  for Slovakia,  and exceeds  50
10  Vodopivec  (1998)  reports  that benefit recipients  in  Slovenia  were  sometimes  not invited  to employment
offices if it was known that they were not available for work (when they provided childcare, for example).
25percent only for Poland and Hungary (men only).' 2 Moreover,  verifying the accuracy of self-
reported eamings  is often not done - in part because  administrative  information  systems  do
not allow  cross-checking  of benefit receipt.  It is thus not surprising that hlicklewright  and
Nagy (1996) report that in Hungary, disqualifications  from unemployment  insurance benefits
occur rarely - for example,  of the March  1992 cohort of unemployment insurance recipients,
4 percent  of spells  ended  that way.  The risk  of disqualification  was much  higher  for  the
young, the less-educated,  blue-collar workers, and those living in the capital, Budapest.
While conceivably these differences  could occur with the same degree of enforcement
of the rules,  in all likelihood  the severity with which the sanctions  are imposed vary across
offices  within the country  - as well as between  countries.  For example,  the risk of benefit
disqualification  in Slovenia is much lower than in Hungary  - in  1998,  only one percent of
spells  ended  with  disqualification,  and  in  1999,  only  0.65  percent,  despite  changes  in
legislation  aimed  at  improving  the monitoring  of benefit  eligibility.  And  in Estonia,  the
country  with  the  most  modest  unenployment  benefit,  casual  evidence  suggest  that
employment  offices sometimes  side with the unemployed  and let them collect benefits until
exhaustion - precisely because the benefit is so low.
The above considerations  have  an important bearing on the effects of income support
systems,  primarily  on  the  decision  to  leave  (formal)  unemployment.  For  example,  if
monitoring of job  search  is  lax,  some  of the unemployed may not make  a genuine  effort to
search  for jobs;  or  they  may  misuse  the  system  by  collecting  benefits  and  performing
undeclared  paid work  at the same  time.  We will  return  to these  issues  in the  section  on
distributive  and efficiency effects.
3.3 Coses f  mnemploymaengpooge¢&
Below  we  present  the  overall  costs  of unemployment  benefit programs  in transition
economies,  as well as summary measures of their generosity,  using an accounting fiamework
developed  by  Vroman  (2002).  The  majority  of  transition  economies  kept  their
"  Earle  and Pauna (1998)  report the average caseload of 668 unemployed  per one unemployed  in Romania  in
1993,  while only a in few OECD countries did the caseload exceeds 100.
12 For the sake of comparison, Bardasi et al (2001)  also  include the UK and Spain in their analysis of Central
European  countries. While  the  t)K has the highest  proportion of benefit recipients  who are actively searching,
Spain's performance is simila  to that of the Central European countries.
26unemployment  benefit  expenditures  below  1 percent  of GDP,  and  Estonia  and  the  Czech
Republic  even below  0.25  percent  of GDP  (Table  9, panel  A),  lower than  in most OECD
countries.  The highest benefit expenditure  shares were recorded  by Poland and Hungary (in
Hungary, this share rapidly decreased in the late 1990s).
The  two  key  determinants  of the  cost  of unemployment  protection  are  the  income
replacement  rate  (RRate) or benefit  level, expressed  as  a fraction  of average  wage,  and the
ratio of benefit recipients and the number of unemployed as identified by labor force surveys
(NBen/Unemp;  note  that  the recipients  are not necessarily  a subset of the  unemployed,  and
that  this  ratio  can  therefore  exceed  1).  The  former  factor  reflects  the  relative  value  of
benefits  while  the  latter  reflects  the  relative  availability of benefits,  both  factors  being
outcomes  of policy  choices.  Vroman  (2002) posits that  the product  of the replacement rate
and  the  share  of compensated  unemployed  captures  more  inclusively  the  generosity  of
unemployment benefit programs.  This product is termed the generosity index (G):
Generosity index (G) = 1  00*RRate*(Nben/Unemp)
Available  evidence  indicates  that  the  replacement  rate  (RRate)  has  declined  in  all
countries  expect  Slovenia (see  Table 9, panel  B).  The  story is more mixed  for the  share of
unemployed  who receive  benefits  (see Table  9, panel C)  - Poland shows the most marked
decline,  from  79 percent  in  1991  to 24 percent  in  1999;  other countries  showed relatively
slight  or  moderate  deviations  across  time.  Hungary  represents  an  interesting  example  of
relatively easy access  to benefits,  with the number of recipients  even exceeding  the number
of unemployed in  1999. An examination of the generosity index of benefit programs  clearly
shows the effect of the sharp  fall in the share of the recipients on the generosity of the Polish
benefit program.  Combining the two effects,  the generosity index shows that the generosity
of unemployment  benefits  is highest in Slovenia and  Hungary,  and lowest  in Estonia, with
the others clustered in the 5 to 15 percent range (see Table 9, panel D, and Figure 4).
27Taible 9:  Expelminfitunres  nlmd Geiaerosflty of UepllRoymnea  D3e1efKfts9 299@
11991  11992  1 1993  1  1994  1 1995  1996  21997  1 199  T 19-99
A. Expenditures  on unemyplo  ment benefits  (as a % of GIDP)
Bulgaria  0.55  0.64  0.96  0.54  - _  _
Czech Republic  0.23  0.18  015  --  0.13  0.14  0.21  0.24  _
Estonia  --  --  - 0.11  0.07  0.07  0.08  -
Hungary*  2.16  2.03  1.07  0.71  0.60  0.46  -
Poland  --  1.71  1.72  1.77  1.88  1.77  --  -
Slovak Republic  0.98  0.60  0.56  0.43  --  --  --
Slovenia*  0.57  0.82  1.22  1.13  0.75  0.71  0.90  0.89  0.79
B3. Unernlloyment benefit replacement rate
Bulgaria  0.68  0.29  0.34  0.31  0.30  0.38  0.30  --  -
Czech Republic  0.42  0.30  0.28  0.27  0.25  0.24  0.24  0.20  0.20
Estonia  --  - 0.17  0.10  0.08  0.07  0.07  0.09  0.09
Hungary*  --  - --  0.25  0.23  0.21  0.20  0.20  0.22
Poland  0.34  0.38  0.36  0.37  0.37  0.33  0.32  0.30  0.24
Slovak Republic  0.49  0.32  0.30  0.27  0.25  0.23  0.30  - --
Slovenia*  0.32  0.29  0.33  0.34  0.33  0.31  0.36  0.37  0.37
C. Tlhe ratio of umem  loyent benefit  recipients and tIhe number of  mom  odl
Bulgaria  - 0.23  0.23  0.29  0.29  0.35  - -
Czech Republic  _  0.33  0.37  0.34  0.37  0.45  0.45  0.43
Estonia  - 0.30  0.20  0.24  0.26  0.25  0.31
Hungary*  - 0.93  0.94  0.96  0.98  1.00  1.06
Poland  0.79  0.52  0.48  0.50  0.59  0.52  0.31  0.23  0.24
Slovak Republic  - 0.40  0.37  0.26  0.32  0.33  - -
Slovenia*  0.46  0.65  0.73  0.72  0.61  0.62  0.72  0.66  0.61
ID.  Generosdty  iindex
Bulgaria  - --  7.7  7.1  8.8  10.9  10.6  - -
Czech Republic  - _  9.5  9.9  8.6  8.9  10.8  9.0  8.5
Estonia  - - - 3.2  1.5  1.9  1.8  1.8  2.8
Hungary*  --  --  --  23.5  22.1  20.4  19.9  20.4  22.7
Poland  27.0  19.8  17.4  18.6  21.6  17.3  9.8  6.9  5.6
SlovakRepublic  - - 12.1  10.1  6.6  7.5  9.8  j  -
Slovenia*  14.6  18.9  24.2  24.2  20.5  20.1  26.6  24.6  22.8
Source:  Employment  Outlook,  OECD,  various  issues,  Czech  Republic:  Statistical  Office
and  Ministry  of Labor  and  Social  Affairs;  Estonia:  National  Labour  Board;  Hungary:
Central  Statstical  Office  and  National  Labour  Centre;  Slovenia:  Yearly  Work  Report  of
Employment Office,  various issues.
* Payments/recipients under both unemployment insurance and unemployment assistance are included.
The  comparison  of  the  generosity  index  of  unemployment  benefit  programs  in
transition economies  (averaged across time) with a sample of OECD countries shows that the
programs  in trasition  economies  are  much  less  generous  than  in the majority  of OECD
28countries  - they  are  comparable  only  to  Portugal,  Greece,  and  the  US.13 The  average
generosity index across transition economies  is  11.3  compared to 26.3  for the OECD sample.
The most significant exceptions  are Hungary and Slovenia,  whose indices of generosity have
been comparable to the average of the OECD sample.
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4.  EVALUATION OF UNEMPLOYMENT  BENEFIT SYSTEMS
Above  we  discussed  how  the  decline  of output  during  the  transition  translated  to
reductions  in  employment  and  increases  in  unemployment,  and  described  the  formal
unemployment  benefit programs  introduced to provide  income support  for the unemployed.
This section seeks to evaluate the performance  of these programs.  Did they provide adequate
and effective  income  support for  the unemployed?  Which groups  of workers  benefited the
13 The  OECD  sample  comprises  of Belgium,  Denmark,  France,  Germany,  Greece,  Ireland,  the  Netherlands,
Portugal,  Spain,  Sweden,  the  UK,  and  the US; data refer  to  1992  (calculations  of G for  the OECD sample  are
from Vroman,  2002).
29most  and  what  were  the  effects  of these  programs  on  poverty?  Was  applying  an  OECD
model - for  example, benefit levels  determined  as a percentage  of an individual's  previous
earnings as opposed to a flat benefit - a prudent choice?  Moreover,  what were the efficiency
effects  of these  programs?  Have  they  - as  commonly  found  in developed  economies  -
affected the work incentives of benefit recipients?  Above all, have they reduced the intensity
of job  search  and  increased  the  reservation  wage,  thereby  prolonging  the  duration  of
unemployment  and  contributing  to  higher  unemployment?  On  the  other  hand,  did  the
introduction of benefit programs  ease the huge and painful  task of enterprise  restructuring?
This section attempts  to answer  some of the above  questions.  We first discuss distributive
and then efficiency effects.
401 Dismib'Vaye effecgs
In  the  mid-1990s,  in  Hungary  and  Poland  unemployment  benefits  represented  a
sizeable  share of household  income, they were received by the majority of households with
unemployed  workers,  and they were  largely directed  to  households  in poverty  or to those
which were  drawn out of poverty by such benefits.  Although they were not designed to do
so, unemployment  benefits in these  two countries  strongly reduced poverty.  In contrast,  in
some other countries in our sample, unemployment  benefit programs  had  limited coverage,
they provided a relatively small share of household income, and they did not reach many of
the poor.  In all countries, unemployment benefits in the mid  1990s were strongly progressive,
thus bringing about the redistribution of income from the rich to the poor.
Coverage.  In  the  mid-1990s,  the  coverage  of  unemployment  benefits  varied
tremendously  among  the  countries  in our  sample  (Table  10).  In  Hungary,  78  percent  of
households  with  at  least  one  unemployed  worker  them  received  unemployment  benefits,
followed  by  65  percent  in  Poland;  in  contrast,  the  coverage  of  households  with  an
unemployed worker was only 17-19 percent in Estonia and Latvia.  Understandably,  from the
standpoint  of coverage  of all households,  the  numbers  are  much lower,  but variations  are
large as well.  Interestingly,  among households with an unemployed  member, the receipt of
unemployment  benefits  is  less  prevalent  among  poor  households,  with  the  exception  of
Estonia.
30Table 10: Coverage, Targeting, Average Share, and Poverty Reduction of Unemployment Benefits'
B_l_arla2  lEstonia  Hun  ary  Latvia  Poland  Slovakia  Slovenia
"h.  Hh.  Hh.  Hth.  Hh.  Hh.
with  with  with  with  with  with
All  hh.  All hh.  unemp.  All  hh..  unemp.  All hh.  unemp.  All hh..  unemp.  All hh..  unemp.  All hh..  unemp.
Coverage (in percent)
The share of households  that receive  UB  4.22  1.94  18.74  16.20  77.53  2.14  17.42  9.31  64.73  7.83  24.35  8.08  42.69
The share of the poor households  that
receive  UB
3 10.57  5.08  20.76  32.49  64.45  5.22  13.01  15.60  51.56  17.75  32.10  13.84  34.64
Targeting  -the share of UB budget received
by the following groups:  .
Poor households  38.92  46.27  46.27  12.77  12.77  19.68  19.68  18.49  18.49  9.94  9.94  19.75  19.75
Households drawn from poverty by UB  12.16  11.60  11.60  38.24  38.24  33.24  33.24  34.35  34.35  25.59  25.59  25.14  25.14
Households  above the poverty threshold
even  if they didn't receive  UB  48.92  42.12  42.12  49.00  49.00  47.08  47.08  47.17  47.17  64.47  64.47  55.11  55.11
Average share of UB in total household
income (in percent), among:  .
All households  0.55  0.43  4.11  4.17  19.94  0.78  6.31  3.21  22.34  0.67  2.07  2.13  11.28
Households  receiving the benefit  13.04  21.92  21.92  25.72  25.72  36.21  36.21  34.51  34.51  8.51  8.51  26.43  26.43
Poverty  reduction brought about by the
UB receipt
In percent of hypothetically poor (pre-.
benefit headcount) 4  3.29  1.33  4.68  40.00  53.28  3.96  9.22  20.57  44.73  21.58  31.19  7.96  15.71
In percent of total population  0.60  0.25  1.84  5.23  19.72  0.59  3.79  3.53  19.21  1.05  2.97  1.31  5.84
Memorandum  Items
Poverty headcount  17.58  18.58  37.41  7.84  17.29  14.32  37.31  13.63  23.74  3.83  6.55  15.15  31.35
Percent of households that have an
unemployed  n.a.  10.37  100  20.90  100  12.31  100  14.38  100  32.14  100  18.92  100
Poverty  Gap 5  3.36  3.43  0.94  1.95  1.89  0.17  2.56
Source:  Own  calculations  from online  HEIDE data (Household  Expenditure  and Income  data for  Transitional  Economies),  URL:  hittp:llwww.worldbank.orelresearcliltransitionlhouse.hti);  for
Slovenia,  data provided  by the Slovenian  Statistical Office.  Survey  year:  Bulgaria,  1995; Hungary,  1993; Latvia,  1997; Poland,  1993; Slovak Republic,  1993; Slovenia,  1997-98.  Sample Size:
Bulgaria:  2,466; Hungary:  8,105; Latvia:  7,690; Poland:  16,051;  Slovakia: 2,129; Slovenia:  2,577.  Survey weights used where  appropriate.
Notes:
Unemployment benefits include both payments of unemployment  insurance and unemployment assistance.
' Bulgarian  data do not allow the identification of unemployed household  members.
Poor are those households (and individuals  living in them) whose income per equivalent  adult is below the poverty  line.  Poverty line is defined as 60 percent of the median of the distribution  of
income per equivalent adult. The number of equivalent  adults is obtained by using the OECD weighing scheme:  I for  the first  adult in the household, 0.7 for each subsequent adult,  and 0.5 for
each child below  15 years.
4Hypothetically  poor are households with pre-unemployment-bencil  income per equivalent adult below the poverty line.
Poverty gap is  the share of income which, if distributed  among the  poor households,  would bring them out of poverty, in total household  income.
31Average share of UB in household income.  Countries  also  varied  greatly  by  how
sizeable was  the average  share of unemployment benefits  in household income.  Among all
households,  this share was the largest in Hungary  (4.2 percent),  followed by Poland  (3.2);
these two countries were also ahead of others when limiting households to those with at least
one unemployed  (in Hungary, the share within this set was  19.9 percent,  and in Poland 22.3
percent).  Comparable  shares  in  other  countries  were  smaller  by  several  times,  with  the
smallest being in Estonia (0.43  and 4.11  percent, in the sets of all households  and households
with at least one unemployed,  respectively).
Targeting. Another look at distributive properties of unemployment  benefits is offered
by viewing how benefits  are  spread over different groups.  Among  all countries,  by far the
largest share of unemployment benefits received by the poor was in Estonia (46 percent), but
the share of individuals who were  drawn out of poverty by unemployment  benefits was the
smallest.  The small share of individuals drawn out of poverty in Estonia is quite likely due to
the modest size of the benefit in the 1990s, as noted above.  The highest share of individuals
drawn out of poverty was recorded  in Hungary,  Poland, and Latvia. As mentioned above,  in
Hungary and Poland, the share of unemployment  benefits in household income was highest
among the countries included in our sample.  The share of unemployment  benefits received
by households ranked above the poverty threshold by their pre-benefit income was highest in
Slovakia (64 percent) and Slovenia (55 percent).
Reduction of  poverty. Although,  admittedly,  the objective of unemployment  insurance
programs  is not poverty relief but rather consumption  smoothing  for the workers  who  lost
their jobs, it is nonetheless interesting to observe to what extent unemployment benefits - by
default, not by design - contributed to fighting poverty.  In line with wide variations of the
above-discussed  distributive  measures,  the  effects  on  poverty  reduction  also  varied
tremendously among  countries.  In Poland and Hungary, the poverty reduction  effects  were
great.  In Hungary, the reduction of poverty among the unemployed was over 50 percent (that
is,  in the  absence  of unemployment  benefits,  the number of poor unemployed would have
more than  doubled),  and in Poland 45  percent.  Even expressed  as percentages  of the total
population  the numbers are large:  in Hungary, 4.1 percent of the total population was drawn
out  of poverty  by  unemployment  benefits,  and  in  Poland,  3.2  percent.  Such  favorable
32results were produced  by the attractive distributive  properties  discussed  above - widespread
coverage,  the  large  share  of benefits  received  by the poor,  and  the benefits  representing  a
relatively large share of total household income, but are partly attributable also to a relatively
small  poverty  gap  in  these  two  countries  (0.94  and  1.95  percent  in  Hungary  and Poland).
The least reduction of poverty by benefits was recorded by Estonia, where 4.7 percent of the
unemployed,  and  0.25 percent  of the total population,  were  drawn  out of poverty by them.
Small  effects  on poverty were recorded also by Bulgaria  and Latvia, reflecting primarily the
low coverage and small share of unemployment benefits in total income.
Incidence of benefits  by income quintiles. Further  insights about  the  redistribution  of
income  implied by unemployment  benefits  are  obtained by the analysis  of their incidence
(Table  11).  In  all  countries,  in  mid-1990s  benefits  were  strongly  progressive  (poorer
households  received  a larger  share of benefits  - Table  11,  panel A).  The most progressive
system  (with the bottom 40 percent of the households receiving 73 percent of unemployment
benefits) was the Estonian one, which may be the consequence  of the flat rate benefit regime.
Interestingly,  among the  households  with at least one unemployed,  the incidence  of benefits
was  regressive, suggesting  that  unemployment  benefits were  effective  in moving recipient
households  up  the  post-benefit  income  distribution.  The  exceptions  were  Estonia  and
Slovakia,  the  countries  with  the  smallest  share  of  unemployment  benefits  in  household
incomes(see  Table  10), where  the  small  scale  of transfers  did not make  a difference  in the
post-benefit  distribution.  The  conclusion  that  unemployment  benefits  were  effective  in
improving  recipients'  relative  income  positions  is  reinforced  by the  evidence  that,  within
households  with  at  least  one  unemployed,  benefits  ranked  by  pre-benefit  income  were
progressive  in all countries  (Table 11, panel B).
In sum, it is startling that although unemployment benefits are focused on job-losers, in
transition  countries  they  nonetheless  contributed  significantly  to  poverty  reduction.
Obviously,  for many households,  earnings  represented  the  single most important household
income,  and unless  it was compensated,  the loss of a job pushed many of such households
into poverty.  The  above  evidence  also suggests  that it is more likely  that unemployment
benefits make a difference  if coverage  is large and the benefit amount  is significant.  While
the fact that Estonia paid a flat benefit (that is, a benefit equal  for all) contributed to the high
33[iBnnI  airla'  E5s0DnIa  IIunt  any  - LalvIa  lPolanud  Silovakia  Silovenia
LHh.  Hh.  Hh.  Hh.  Hh.  Hh.
with  . with  wilh..wth  . with  . with
.__________________________________  j  All hh.  All hh.  unemp.  All hh..  unemp.  All hh.  unemp.  All h  __  it hh..  unemp.  All b..  unemp.
A. lHouseholnls  ranked by post-heneflt income
Highest quintile (the richest)  11.54  6.44  19.83  7.97  19.49  20.01  37.62  5.28  20.45  13.27  24.81  8.70  32.75
Second quintile  7.42  13.99  12.74  13.00  21.23  18.59  27.48  11.43  22.33  11.53  13.10  18.67  25.51
Third quintile  12.90  11.05  24.28  17.63  21.55  16.64  14.12  20.05  20.93  15.18  20.24  26.31  15.17
Fourth quintile  19.28  16.50  11.77  24.05  21.12  15.67  11.68  28.13  19.99  26.06  16.08  18.77  15.05
Lowest quintile (the poorest)  48.86  52.02  31.38  37.35  16.62  29.09  9.10  35.11  16.30  33.95  25.78  27.54  11.52
B.  Houselnhlds rarnked  by pre-beneft  egneome
Highest  uintile (the richest)  6.29  5.81  16.73  2.92  12.82  5.11  13.55  2.60  |  14.34  7.46  15.98  3.85  18.62
Secondauintile  10.26  10.91  11.48  4.95  14.97  7.67  16.58  4.03  1 16.79  8.51  13.96  . 8.14  1 18.09
Third quintile  7.72  8.33  15.13  9.78  18.69  13.33  17.71  9.67  18.40  14.80  13.10  14.19  17.82
Fourth  uintile  16.70  13.94  18.76  14.61  22.57  8.99  15.18  19.15  21.07  15.56  12.27  24.86  17.30
Lowest quintile (the poorest)  59.03  61.01  37.90  67.75  30.95  64.90  36.97  64.55  29.40  53.66  44.69  48.96  A8.17
Source:  same as for Table  10.
Notes:
H-louseholds  are  ranked  by  income  per equivalent  adult  (see  Table  10  for  the  equivalency  scale).  Unemployment  benefits  include  both  payments  of
unemployment  insurance  and unemployment  assis9ance.
2 Bulgarian data do not allow the identification of unemployed household  members.
34share  of benefits  received  by  the poor  (the  share  of benefits  received  by the  poor  in  an
earnings-related  scheme  would be lower),  the  low amount  of the benefit prevented  a more
significant  effect  on poverty reduction among recipients.  Of course,  the  size of the  poverty
gap  also determined  the effectiveness  of transfers  in reducing poverty - for example, despite
channeling  quite a high share of benefits to the (pre-benefit) poor,  Estonia's  and Bulgaria's
overall  effect on reduction of poverty was modest not only because of the small level of the
benefit, but also because their poverty was so deep.  The evidence also shows that the income
redistribution  produced by unemployment  benefits  was  strongly progressive,  although it  did
not reach  the extreme  outcomes  obtained,  for example, in  Chile, where  about  60 percent of
unemployment  benefits  is received  by the poorest  quintile of the population  (Krumm  et al,
1994).  Because  unemployment  insurance  contribution  rates  are  earnings  related,  the
incidence of net benefits,  that is, the incidence  of benefits once both the cost and benefits are
considered, is even more progressive.14
The  above  evidence  on  distributive  effects  shows  that  unemployment  benefits
redistributed  income  from the rich to the poor and significantly reduced poverty.  Have such
effects  been  produced  by  worsening  efficiency,  for  example,  by  producing  work
disincentives?  This is the topic which we discuss next.
4.2 Efficiency effects
Below  we  summarize the results of studies on how unemployment  insurance  schemes
affected  economic  efficiency;  we also  present  some  new evidence  on Estonia,  the country
with perhaps  the most parsimonious  unemployment  benefit  system  of the  countries  studied
here.  Above  all,  we  focus  on  incentive  effects  (on job-search  effort  and  the  duration  of
unemployment,  on the restructuring  of enterprises  and on the overall  reallocation  of labor,
and on the labor supply of other family members), and on aggregate effects.
Effects  on  the  duration of unemployment  spells.  Theoretical  predictions  about  the
effect  of unemployment  benefits  on job-search  effort  are ambiguous.  A  stylized  prediction
from  simple  theoretical  models  is  that  an  increase  in unemployment  benefit  reduces  the
recipient's probability  of transition  from unemployment  to employment, that is, it increases
14 The  inpact of unemployment  benefits  is less progressive  in  developed  countries.  As  shown  by Forster
(2000),  the effects of benefits are progressive in about half of the  OECD countries, and neutral in the other half.
35the expected  duration of unemployment.  This follows  from job-search models  (because the
reservation  wage  is  assumed  to  rise  initially with the benefit  level),  as  well as from  labor
supply models  (because  less  income  is  forgone  by staying  unemployed).  However,  once
more complexity is introduced into the models (for example, recognizing  that unemployment
insurance is paid only for a finite period and that by taking employment,  one re-qualifies  for
unemployment  insurance) it can also be shown that an increase of the benefit rate makes the
transition to  employment  more  attractive,  not less  (see Atkinson  and Micklewright,  1991).
Or one  can  argue that  unemployment  benefits  increases  resources  devoted  to  search  and
hence increases the probability of finding  a job.  In other words,  the theoretical predictions
on the effects of longer durations and higher replacement rates on the probability of transition
from unemployment to employment are ambiguous.
In contrast  to the  ambiguity of predictions  arising  from theoretical  models,  empirical
evidence is much more clear-cut.  Similar to the evidence on developed economies,  empirical
studies for transition economies show that unemployment  benefits reduce the probability of
leaving  unemployment  to  take  a  job.1 5 Except  for  Romania,  the  negative  effects  of  the
potential benefit duration on the probability of exit from unemployment to employment  have
been  confirned  for  all  countries  for  which  such  studies  were  performed,  although  some
studies  also  found  little  evidence  of work  disincentives  (see  Table  12  for  a  sunmmary  of
empirical  findings).  It is  particularly  interesting  that the adverse  incentive  effects  can be
detected  even  in Estonia,  a country with  far the most parsimonious  unemployment  benefit
program  (see  Figure  5).16  Most  studies  find  that  the  exit  rate  from  unemployment  to
employment  significantly increases  near benefit exhaustion (in some countries, the exit rate
to inactivity also increases).  The effects of the replacement  ratio are less pronounced:  Ham
et al.  (1999)  find significant effects for the Czech  Republic but not for Slovakia;  Vodopivec
(1995) also finds insignificant effects for Slovenia.  As for the scale of these effects, Ham et
is The vast majority of studies  on developed  economies  find the  elasticity of duration of unemployment  with
respect  to replacement  rate  and particularly  to  duration  is positive,  and that there  is  a  sharp  increase  in the
probability of exit to enployment just before  the benefit is exhausted (for a thorough  review of the literature,
see, for example, Devine and Keifer (1991), or Atkinson and Micklewright,  1991).
16  This phenomenon may be explained by the fact that employment offices - because of the low leel of  benefits
- are reluctant to take steps to disqualify benefit recipients.
36al (1999)  find the effects  for the Czech Republic to be comparable to the ones in developed
economies  (few  other  studies  provide  estimates  of  the  (elasticity  of  the  duration  of
unemployment  with respect to potential  duration and level of benefits).17 Micklewright  and
Nagy (1996) estimate that about  8 percent  of exits  to jobs from unemployment  occur at the
point  of exhaustion,  Vodopivec  (1995)  provides  an  estimate  of about  6  percent,  and  our
calculations for Estonia produce an even higher figure, namely, 32 percent of such cases.
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Note:  Based on  1998  observations  (853  censored);  data  from the  1995  Estonian Labor Force  Survey
(see data description in Vodopivec 2002).
The  above  results  of  analytical  studies  on  the  work  disincentives  created  by
unemployment benefits systems suggest that transition economies have certainly not escaped,
them but that such disincentives are of similar in magnitude to those in developed economies.
Moreover,  the  differences  in the  strength  of these  disincentive  effects  among  countries  is
large,  and  both  parsimonious  and  generous  systems  have  generated  such  disincentives.
Variations  in the magnitude of these effects are produced by differences  in the effectiveness
of monitoring ofjob search and the enforcement of the work test among countries.
7 According  to Layard  et al (1991),  the benefit elasticity ranges  from 0.2 to 0.9,  depending on the state of the
labor market  and the  country concerned.  According  to Katz and  Meyer (1990),  the duration elasticity in the
U.S. is in the range of 0.4 to 0.5.
37Talmle  112:  1im  vem Efffects of Ue  lmploymo¢nte  IBemeff½ts ½n T  nsntnono  Emomooes
Sttudy  I  Mode/Metlnootlcu  I  Indhna
BuEgar_a_____di
Jones and Kotzeva (1998)  Survivor fiunctions, binary logit  Exit rate to employment  increases between the 1  8U'  and 260  month of the spell
(social assistance benefit exhaustion).
Study of the effects  of the transition  Survival functions indicate "waiting behavior" for social assistance recipients.
to social assistance
Cazes and Scarpetta  (1998)  Empirical hazard  function,  Exit probability toward the end of the entitlement period increased  dramatically.
piece-wise  constant hazard  Unemployment  benefit recipients exit unemployment more slowly than non-
function  recipients, many leave to inactivity rather than to employment.
Kotzeva, Mircheva, and A.  Binomial  logit  Recipients  of Ul are significantly less likely to take a job.
Woergoetter (1996)
Czech  _Rerpubft_
Ham,  Svejnar and Terrell (1998)  Hazard model  Elasticity of duration with respect to:
- increase of replacement rate = 0.34
- increase in duration of benefit = 0.4
Est3nla
Own calculation (see Figure 5)  Empirical hazard function  Exit to employment significantly increases around the point of benefit
I __________________I________  exhaustion
Iungmgry
Micklewright and Nagy (1998)  Non-parametric and parametric  High proportion of Ul recipients  remain until benefit exhaustion.
proportional hazard,  discrete  Exit rates are characterized  by a large spike in the period immediately afler
time-duration model  benefit exhaustion:  job-exit hazard increases six- to eight-fold in comparison to
the period prior to exhaustion.
POIEnd
Adamcehik (1999)  Proportional hazard  Negative  effect of the receipt of benefits on probability of exit to a job, dramatic
increase of the hazard as the benefit is about to expire.
Puhani (1996)  Hazard  model  Entitlement to unemployment benefits significantly prolongs duration of
unemployment
Steiner and Kwiatkowski  (1995)  Multinomial  logit  UR recipients  had lower exit rates than non-UT  recipients, particularly  with (cited in Kwiatkowski,  1998)  respect.to  the exit rate from unemployment to inactivity.
Boeri and Steiner (1996)  Hazard model  Exit rates increase as entitlement duration approaches exhaustion,  especially in
the capital  (males:  increased flow to employment;  females:  increased flow to
inactivity).
Exit rate to inactivity  increased markedly in the month after benefit exhaustion.
38Table 12:  Incentives  Effects  of Unemployment  Benefits  in Transition Economies  (cont'd.)
Study  |  Model/Methodology  Findings
Poland  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Cazes and Scarpetta (1998)  Empirical hazard  function,  Exit probability related  to differentiated  maximum lengths of UB entitlement.
piece-wise  constant hazard  Unemployment benefit recipients  exit unemployment  much more slowly than
function  iion-recipients, but many leave to  inactivity rather than to employment,
.___  ___  ____ ___  ____  ___ ____  ___  ______  ____especially  in backward areas.
Romanla
Earle and Pauna (1998)  Hazard  model  Receipt of benefits increases probability of leaving unemployment  (no
___________________________  _  |  .disincentive  effects).
Slovakia
Lubyova and Ours (1999)  Proportional hazard  Little evidence of disincentive  effects.
Hamn,  Svejnar and Terrell (1998)  Hazard  model  Elasticity of duration with respect to:
- increase of  replacement rate = 0.06
- increase in duration of benefit = 0.41
Slovenla
Vodopivec  (1995)  Semi-parametric  proportional  Strong waiting effect - exit to employment significantly increases just before
hazard  benefit exhaustion
39Enhancing restructuring of enterprises and labor reallocation.  It may seem  that,  in
order  to  speed  up  restructuring,  the  optimal  level  of  insurace  protection  against
unemployment  is higher during the transition (for example, so as to overcome the reluctance
of  managers  to  lay-off  workers).  However,  the  theoretical  grounds  for  increasing
unemployment  benefits to spur restructuring is weak. Blanchard  (1997, pp.  113-4)  shows that
more  generous  benefits  indeed  add  to  the  attractiveness  of  restructuring  and  to  take
unemployment risk, but at the same time hinder job creation.  He concludes that "the case for
increasing unemployment benefits  on efficiency grounds is limited."  The review of literature
on transition  economies  did not  reveal  any  rigorous  investigations  of this  issue,  although
several  studies  asserted  that  the  introduction  of  unemployment  benefits  helped  the
restructuring process. 18
From  a political  economy  perspective,  the connection  between  willingness  to  accept
mass  layoffs  and  the  existence  of a social  safety  net  may  seem  quite  plausible.  Casual
comparisons of policies and outcomes across countries, however, suggest that there are other,
much  more  powerful  forces  at  work which  influence  the  pace of restucturing  and  labor
reallocation.  For  example,  in  Slovenia,  a  country  with  one  of  the  most  generous
unemployment  benefit  programs  among  the transition  economies  (see above),  the pace  of
labor reallocation  lagged much behind the pace of labor reallocation  in Estonia,  the country
with the most meager benefits  among the  countries under consideration  (see Figure 6 for the
comparison of the intensity of restructuring among selected transition countries as measured
by excess job reallocation rate).
18  Very  interesting  insights  about  the  potential  of unemployment  benefits  to  stimulate  restructuring  are
obtained by the simulation of the introduction of a modest unemployment  benefit system in Russia (the system
would  provide  one  third  of median  cash  eamings  in  the  form  unemployment  assistance,  see Klugman  et al,
2002).  By increasing  the current wage  floor,  such an introduction would  stimulate "high quality" mobility, as
up  to  14  percent  of  employed  workers  would  become  no  worse  off  than  unemployed.  Of course,  the
effectiveness  of unemployment  benefit to stimulate mobility would depend on many other factors - job creation
capacity of the economy certainly being one of the most important ones.
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Source: Faggio,  G. and J. Konings (1999)
Note  that  some  other  institutions  used  to  keep  unemployment  low  or  to  preempt
inflows  into  unemployment  stand  directly  in the  way  of labor  reallocation:  employment
protection  legislation  (including  severance  pay provisions)  is  clearly on the top of this  list
(see the model of Blanchard,  1998, showing that larger job security leads to more "sclerotic"
labor markets).'9 Note  also  that there  are theoretical  arguments for  and empirical  support  of
claims  that  tight job  security  provisions  reduce  labor  force  participation.  For example,
OECD (1999) finds a strong link between stricter EPL and (i) higher unemployment rates for
younger workers,  (ii) higher rates of self-employment,  and (iii) lower employment  rates for
prime-age  women,  youths and  older workers;  Heckman  and Pages  (2000)  also  confirm the
link  between  job  security  and  lower  employment  and  attribute  5 percentage  points  of
employment reduction in Latin America to job security provisions.
Effects  on labor supply of other family members.  Because  unemployment  assistance
requires  means-testing,  one  can expect  that  this will  create  disincentives  for  other family
members  to  take  a job.  There  is  empirical  evidence  supporting  such predictions  for the
Slovak Republic and for Poland.  For example,  Terrell  et al (1996) report that the presence of
an  unemployed  spouse  lowered  the  hazard  of exit  to  employment  of  social  assistance
l9  Vodopivec  (2000)  shows  that worker  and job  flows  in Estonia's transition  have  surpassed  those  in  most
other transition  economies,  thereby  contnbuting  to  the  efficient  reallocation  of labor,  and attributes  that  to
deliberate policies aimed at stimulating job creation and employment, chief among them being low employment
protection.
41recipients by 72 percent for females  and by 82 percent for males.  Similar effects are reported
for Poland by Boeri (1997).
Aggregate effects.  The survey of the  literature  revealed  only two  studies  explicitly
addressing  the  link  between  the  generosity  of  the  unemployment  benefit  system  and
aggregate  effects.20 Investigating  the  link  between  unemployment  and  labor  market
institutions in 8 transition  economies  in the late  1990s,  Cazes  (2002) finds that overall  and
long-term unemployment  rates were  not significantly  affected  by the  replacement  rate  and
duration  of unemployment  benefit  programs,  but  that  - somewhat  counterintuitively  - a
longer benefit duration  had a  significant positive  association with the youth unemployment
rate.  Similarly,  Boeri  (1996) reports that in the early  1990s,  no significant  changes  in the
escape  rate to jobs were  associated with the reductions  of the generosity of unemployment
benefits  in Hungary,  Poland,  and  the Slovak Republic,  but he also  finds that in  the Czech
Republic  (where more job opportunities existed) the policy shift did increase the intensity of
escape  rates.  It  also  remains  to  be  seen  what  are  the  long-term  consequences  of the
introduction  of traditional  unemployment  insurance  in an environment  of relatively  strong
labor  unions and  centralized  wage  setting  - in particular,  whether  such arrangements  will
produce  labor  market  outcomes  similar  to those  in the  countries  of continental  European
Community ('Eurosclerosis").21
§.  CONCLUSHJ$OMS  AND IFOLIHCY HILI[CAl'WHCN$
To help the swollen ranks of the unemployed,  all transition economies  introduced new labor
market  programs,  both  income  support  programs  tailored  according  to  traditional
unemployment  insurance  programs,  as  well  as  active  measures.  Because  transition
economies were  ill-prepared for the emergence  of  large-scale  unemployment,  there is litle
20  Riboud et al (2001)  discuss the labor market outcomes of trasition economies  in the framework of policies
and institutions, but stop short of econometric  testing of  the relationship.
21  Theoretical  models  on unemployment  persistence  show that economies  with UI systems experience  larger
and  more prolonged  unemployment  following  transient shocks.  For example,  Ljungqvist  and  Sargent (1997)
develop  a model  to study the  dynamics  of two economies,  one  with  an  UI system and one  without,  when a
transient  economic  shock  is  introduced.  The  non-UI  economy  recovers  more  rapidly  as  reservation  wages
adjust quicker and job search intensity is higher than in the UI economy.  Nickell and Layard (1999) also show
that unemployment benefits raise equilibriun unemployment.
42doubt  that  the  introduction  of public  cash  benefit  programs  for  the  unemployed  was
warranted.  Due  to  the  unexpected  and  sudden  occurrence  of unemployment,  individuals
were  unable  to  prepare  for  this  event  by self-insuring  (for  example,  by  saving)  and  self-
protecting  (for  example,  by choosing  a  more  stable job);  undeveloped  financial  markets
made things worse.  Moreover,  the magnitude and the covariance of the shock rendered  other
private copying mechanisms  (such as private transfers) inadequate.
The  above  review  of  their  performance  shows  quite  a  positive  experience  with
unemployment  benefit  programs.  The  evidence  shows  that  in  all  transition  economies
included in our sample, unemployment benefits helped to redistribute income from the rich to
the poor.  Moreover,  although not designed  for this task, in some economies unemployment
benefits  strongly  reduced  poverty.  Specifically,  their  impact  on  poverty  was  strong  in
countries where programs had broad coverage and where benefits constituted a sizeable  share
of household  income.  On  the  other  hand,  there  is also  evidence  - as  it is  for developed
economies  - that unemployment  benefits created work disincentives.  (It is possible that the
availability  of  unemployment  benefits,  by  increasing  labor  costs  and  wage  pressures,
contributed to higher unemployment,  and that it generated  more persistent unemployment -
but no such imnpact has been confirmed in the literature.)
How can these programs be improved?  The above analysis suggests that - at least for
those transition  economies with weak administrative  capacity - a flat benefit level (equal for
all  recipients)  may  be  more  appropriate  than  earnings-related  benefit  (equal  to  a  certain
percent  of  an  individual's  previous  earnings).  Flat  benefits  would  not  only  foster
redistribution of income from the rich to the poor and mitigate work disincentive effects, but
also  simplify the  administration  of benefits  and  reduce  the scope  for misuses.  The  above
results  on disincentives,  together  with the description  of implementation problems  faced by
these programs,  also suggest that transition  economies  should improve the administration  of
their benefit  programs.  This includes better monitoring of conditions  for keeping benefits -
including  checking  availability  for work  and  concealed  employment,  enforcing job  search
(for example, by requiring proofs ofjob search) and providing adequate job-search assistance
43through  counseling,  workshops,  and job clubs.  22  To  deter misuses  of the program,  the
approach  used  by  Westem  countries  could  be  followed  by  (1)  requiring  recipients  to
regularly  declare  their casual  earnings;  (2)  taking  away  a portion  of the  benefit  beyond  a
certain  threshold,  in  proportion  to  declared  earnings;  and  (3)  performing  checks  on  the
accuracy  of  declared  eamings  through  cross-referencing  administrative  databases  (for
example, tax returns and work history data bases).
With  the  changing  nature  of unemployment  - in  the  l990s,  the  share  of long-term
unemployed  increased  in  all  transition  economies  - the  problem  of the  limited  benefit
duration  of unemployment  insurance  programs  has  become  more  prominent.  Instead  of
increasing the maximum duration of unemployment  insurance  eligibility, one way to address
this problem is by offering unemployment assistance  to claimants who have exhausted their
eligibility  for unemployment  insurance  benefits,  a practice  which  already  exists  in several
transition  countries.  Although  unemployment  assistance  does  not necessarily  create  less
work  disincentives  than  unemployment  insurance  (Vroman,  2002),  better  targeting  under
unemployment  assistance  can  generate  savings,  and  its  a  istration  would  not  create
excessive  demands  on increasingly  sophisticated  delivery  systems  of Central  and  Eastem
European transition countries.
22 OECD (2000) reports several successful  cases among OECD countries where more stringent enforcement of
benefit eligibility criteria and stricter imposition of sanctions contributed to the reduction of unemployment
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